At Reset—Dialogues on Civilizations, Nadia Urbinati reflects on the democratic virtues of dissent:
In democratic society the value of individuality acquires moral legitimacy and judicial codification because of the existence of relationships between individuals as relationships of equality between different people. It is expressed in an ethical form (as feelings of partiality and cooperation) and in a legal form (as the right to individual freedom and political and social equality). Together, these two aspects compose what can be called a democratic moral constitution. In a representative democracy, this moral constitution permeates and orients citizens’ deliberative competence, and simultaneously protects political and legal order from the illiberal inclinations of powerful and arrogant majorities as well as anti-egalitarian inclinations resulting from economic and corporative interests.
The constitutional morality of democratic society also establishes limits for tolerance, pluralism and freedom to dissent. In a constitutional democracy each individual is guaranteed the legal freedom to also challenge its fundamental principles. However, while the constitution defends the right to dissent, citizens and society must be able to and capable of developing civil sentiments that do not destroy the social fabric. Moral limitations of individual freedom and tolerance guaranteed by the democratic constitution are, or should be, intrinsic to the ethos pervading democracy itself.
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